India is the world’s most populous country, the sixth-largest economy, and the world’s largest democracy. It is a declared nuclear weapons state that has never signed the NPT, instead operating under its own voluntary No First Use (NFU) doctrine. India occupies a uniquely pivotal position in the international system: simultaneously a member of BRICS and QUAD, a major partner of both the US and Russia, a democracy with deep suspicions of China, and a founding architect of the Non-Aligned Movement (1961).

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi (in power since 2014), India has pursued “strategic autonomy” — a foreign policy that refuses alignment with any bloc and extracts maximum benefit from relationships with competing great powers. India abstained on all UN votes condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, continues buying Russian oil at discounted prices, and simultaneously deepens defence and technology cooperation with the United States. This is not inconsistency — it is a deliberate strategy reflecting India’s self-conception as a rising great power that answers to no one.

India has no formal mutual defence alliances. It is a member of the QUAD (with the US, Japan, and Australia) — a security dialogue focused on the Indo-Pacific widely seen as a soft balancing coalition against China — while maintaining close defence ties with Russia (historically India’s largest arms supplier) and deepening economic and technology partnerships with the US under the iCET (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology) framework. India’s doctrine of “strategic autonomy” explicitly rejects permanent alliances in favour of issue-by-issue partnerships.

India’s defence spending spiked 8.9% to $92.1 billion in 2024 (SIPRI, 2026) — cementing it as the world’s fifth-largest defence spender. At approximately 1.9% of GDP, this reflects a defence budget growing faster than the already rapidly expanding economy. Domestically, the government’s defence allocation crossed 7.85 lakh crore rupees (~$93.5 billion), driven by the “Make in India” indigenisation drive.

The Indian Armed Forces have approximately 1.46 million active personnel — the second-largest active military after China. India is estimated to possess approximately 172 nuclear warheads (FAS, 2024) and maintains a triad (land, sea, air delivery). India operates two aircraft carriers and is the world’s largest arms importer, though indigenisation is a stated strategic priority.

China (LAC): India and China share a 3,488km disputed border (Line of Actual Control). The June 2020 Galwan Valley clash killed 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops — the deadliest border incident since 1967. Relations remain severely strained with troops in face-off positions at multiple LAC points.

Pakistan (Kashmir): India and Pakistan both claim the full territory of Kashmir and have fought three wars with it as a major flashpoint. Both are nuclear-armed. Pakistan-based militant groups have conducted attacks on Indian soil — most significantly the 2008 Mumbai attacks (166 killed). India revoked Jammu & Kashmir’s special constitutional status in 2019, drawing international criticism.

UNSC permanent seat: India is the most prominent advocate for UN Security Council reform, arguing that a body reflecting 1945 power structures cannot legitimately govern the 21st-century world. It is widely considered the strongest candidate for a new permanent seat if reform occurs.

Strategic autonomy tensions: India’s refusal to condemn Russia over Ukraine has created friction with Western partners, while its deepening US ties have created friction with Russia and China. Managing all three simultaneously is the central challenge of Indian foreign policy.

• 1SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database 2024 — sipri.org
• 2FAS, Indian Nuclear Forces — fas.org
• 3IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 2024 — imf.org
• 4Indian Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2023–24 — mod.gov.in
• 5White House, US-India iCET Joint Statement 2023 — whitehouse.gov