Brazil
BR · South America · Leading regional power · Largest economy in Latin America
Brazil is South America’s largest country by both territory and population, the tenth-largest economy globally, and the dominant power in Latin America. Brazil’s foreign policy tradition is rooted in sovereignty, non-intervention, and multilateralism — principles embedded in its 1988 constitution, which explicitly prohibits interference in other states’ internal affairs and the use of war to settle disputes. It is more accurately characterised as a leading regional power than a superpower — its influence is substantial within Latin America and in multilateral forums, but it does not project military power globally.
Under President Lula (returned to power January 2023), Brazil has reasserted strategic autonomy — refusing to join Western sanctions against Russia, positioning itself as a potential Ukraine-Russia mediator, deepening BRICS engagement, and simultaneously maintaining strong economic ties with the US and EU. Brazil is the most prominent example of a large democracy pursuing non-Western-aligned foreign policy without being authoritarian.
Brazil has no military alliances. It is the dominant power in MERCOSUR (the South American common market, founded 1991) and was a key architect of UNASUR. Brazil joined BRICS at its founding (2009) and hosted the G20 presidency in 2024. Brazil holds a “Major Non-NATO Ally” (MNNA) designation from the US (granted 2019), though this has not prevented significant policy disagreements on Ukraine and other issues. Brazil has a special relationship with the Portuguese-speaking world through the CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language Countries).
Brazil’s annual defence budget is approximately 1.2% of GDP — modest for a country of its size. However, a landmark defence modernisation bill passed by the Brazilian government carves out an additional R$30 billion (~$5 billion) over six years as an off-budget strategic fund, shielding long-term programmes from annual budget fluctuations (CAAT, 2025). This fund covers the Álvaro Alberto nuclear-powered submarine programme (the only such programme in South America), the Swedish Gripen fighter jet fleet, and the SISFRON border monitoring system.
The Brazilian Armed Forces have approximately 360,000 active personnel. Brazil’s domestic arms industry (Embraer military aircraft, Iveco armoured vehicles) exports globally. The military has historically played a significant domestic political role, including the 1964–1985 military dictatorship — a legacy that resurfaced in debates around the January 8, 2023 Brasília riots.
Amazon sovereignty: Brazil has consistently resisted international pressure over Amazon deforestation, framing external concern as interference in Brazilian sovereignty. Under Lula (returned 2023), deforestation has fallen significantly compared to the Bolsonaro era, easing but not eliminating international friction on the issue.
Venezuela: Brazil shares a 2,200km border with Venezuela. The collapse of the Venezuelan economy produced over 7.7 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants globally — over 600,000 in Brazil, primarily in Roraima state. Brazil-Venezuela relations have fluctuated significantly across administrations.
Ukraine-Russia mediation: Brazil’s refusal to condemn Russia and its self-positioning as a mediator has strained relations with the EU and US. Lula has proposed a “peace club” of non-aligned states, framing Brazil as a bridge between Global South and Western positions — a role that reflects Brazilian foreign policy tradition but has produced limited results.
Falklands/Malvinas: Brazil does not recognise UK sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and supports Argentina’s position within Latin American regional frameworks, though it does not take an active bilateral diplomatic role.
Brazil is the most important case study for “Southern autonomy” in IR — the idea that large developing democracies can and should pursue foreign policies independent of both Western liberalism and authoritarian alternatives. Brazilian scholars developed the concept of “autonomy through participation”: the best way to protect Brazilian interests is to be deeply embedded in international institutions while retaining the right to dissent. Brazil is also central to debates about emerging middle powers — states large enough to matter globally but not dominant enough to set the rules, who therefore have a structural interest in multilateralism and reform of existing institutions rather than replacement.
- 1SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database 2024 — sipri.org
- 2IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 2024 — imf.org
- 3CAAT, Brazil Defence Modernisation — caat.org.uk
- 4UNHCR, Venezuela Refugee Crisis — unhcr.org
- 5Brazilian Constitution 1988, Article 4 (foreign policy principles) — planalto.gov.br