Lithuania occupies the most geopolitically complex position of the three Baltic states. It is the only Baltic country that shares a border with both Russia (the Kaliningrad exclave) and Belarus, and it controls the Suwalki Corridor — a 104km strip of land connecting Poland to Lithuania that is the only land link between the Baltic states and the rest of NATO. If Russia and Belarus were to seize the Suwalki Corridor, the Baltic states would be cut off from NATO reinforcement by land. This makes Lithuania the most strategically critical point on NATO’s northeastern flank.

Lithuania was the first Soviet republic to declare independence (1990), and its foreign policy since 1991 has been defined by achieving and deepening NATO and EU membership as insurance against Russian revisionism. Lithuania adopted an especially assertive posture after 2022, calling for increased NATO force deployments and supporting Ukraine more vocally than almost any other EU member relative to its size.

Lithuania joined NATO and the EU in 2004. It hosts a NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroup led by Germany at Rukla military base. The 2022 NATO Madrid Summit agreed to upgrade the eFP presence toward a pre-positioned brigade in Lithuania. Lithuania was the first country to cut off Russian gas imports following the 2022 invasion, switching to LNG imports via the Klaipėda floating LNG terminal — a decision that took years of infrastructure investment and was vindicated when Europe scrambled to do the same.

Lithuania’s defence spending reached approximately 4.0% of GDP in 2024, and the Seimas has since passed a historic budget allocating over 5.3% of GDP to defence — making Lithuania one of the highest defence spenders relative to GDP in the entire NATO alliance (NATO, 2025; Lithuanian MoD, 2026). The Lithuanian Armed Forces have approximately 22,000 active and reserve personnel. Lithuania reintroduced mandatory military conscription in 2015 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea — making it the first Baltic state to do so and a model others followed after 2022.

Lithuania has been one of the most vocal EU members on Ukraine support, Taiwan, and China policy. In 2021 it allowed Taiwan to open a representative office in Vilnius under the name “Taiwanese” rather than “Taipei” — a significant diplomatic departure from EU consensus — prompting China to downgrade diplomatic relations and impose trade restrictions.

Suwalki Corridor: The 104km Poland-Lithuania border strip is NATO’s most vulnerable geographic point. A Russian-Belarusian operation to seize it would physically isolate the Baltic states. NATO planning treats its defence as a top priority and has conducted extensive exercises focused on the corridor.

Kaliningrad transit dispute (2022): Lithuania’s 2022 decision to restrict rail transit of sanctioned goods to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad caused a major diplomatic incident. Russia called it “openly hostile,” and Lithuania ultimately modified the restrictions under EU guidance, illustrating the tension between national assertiveness and EU solidarity.

China trade retaliation: Following the Taiwan representative office decision in 2021, China removed Lithuania from its customs system and pressured multinational companies not to use Lithuanian components. The dispute marked a turning point in EU-China relations and prompted the EU to develop an anti-coercion instrument.

Belarus: Lithuania shares a 679km border with Belarus and has been a primary transit route for Belarusian opposition figures and media following the 2020 disputed election and crackdown. Vilnius hosts major Belarusian opposition figures in exile.

• 1NATO, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2024) — nato.int
• 2Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence — kam.lt
• 3European Commission, EU Anti-Coercion Instrument — ec.europa.eu
• 4IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 2024 — imf.org